

BILAL A. ESSAYLI  
Acting United States Attorney  
JOSEPH T. MCNALLY  
Assistant United States Attorney  
Acting Chief, Criminal Division  
JUAN M. RODRIGUEZ (Cal. Bar No. 313284)  
MICHAEL J. MORSE (Cal. Bar No. 291763)  
LAURA A. ALEXANDER (Cal. Bar No. 313212)  
Assistant United States Attorneys  
Public Corruption and Civil Rights Section  
1100 United States Courthouse  
312 North Spring Street  
Los Angeles, California 90012  
Telephone: (213) 894-0304/7367/1019  
Facsimile: (213) 894-0141  
Email: [juan.rodriguez@usdoj.gov](mailto:juan.rodriguez@usdoj.gov)  
[michael.morse@usdoj.gov](mailto:michael.morse@usdoj.gov)  
[laura.alexander@usdoj.gov](mailto:laura.alexander@usdoj.gov)

Attorneys for Plaintiff  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

YASIEL PUIG VALDES,

Defendant.

No. 2:22-CR-394-DMG

GOVERNMENT'S MOTION IN LIMINE NO.  
3 TO PRECLUDE IMPROPER ARGUMENT  
REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT'S  
INVESTIGATION AND CHARGING  
DECISION

Hearing Date: October 22, 2025  
Time: 11:00 a.m.  
Location: Courtroom of the  
Hon. Dolly M. Gee

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, the Acting United States Attorney for the Central District of California and Assistant United States Attorneys Juan M. Rodriguez, Michael J. Morse, and Laura A. Alexander, hereby files its motion in limine to preclude improper argument regarding the government's investigation and charging decision.

///

///

1 This motion in limine is based upon the attached memorandum of  
2 points and authorities, the files and records in this case, and such  
3 further evidence and argument as the Court may permit. Defendant  
4 opposes this motion.

5 Dated: September 29, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

6 BILAL A. ESSAYLI  
Acting United States Attorney

7 JOSEPH T. MCNALLY  
8 Assistant United States Attorney  
Acting Chief, Criminal Division

9  
10 /s/ Laura A. Alexander

JUAN M. RODRIGUEZ

11 MICHAEL J. MORSE

12 LAURA A. ALEXANDER

Assistant United States Attorneys

13 Attorneys for Plaintiff  
14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

In February 2023, approximately two months before Yasiel Puig Valdes ("defendant") was set to proceed to trial in April 2023, defendant filed a motion seeking discovery "to show that similarly situated individuals of a different race and cultural background than [defendant] were not prosecuted." (Dkt. 59 at 1.) Within that motion, defendant alleged that the investigative team's pattern in conducting interviews "was markedly different depending on whether the individual being interviewed was Black or not Black," and specifically alleged that defendant himself was interviewed, investigated, and charged because of and in a manner consistent with the investigative team's racial bias against him. (Id.) The Court ultimately denied this motion, finding that defendant failed to "come forward with some credible evidence of discriminatory intent and effect," and that there was simply "no evidence to suggest that [18 U.S.C. § 1001] admonitions [in interviews] were given in anything but a race-neutral manner." (Dkt. 106 at 6-7.)

Notwithstanding the lack of any credible evidence to support his racial-prejudice theory, defendant did not miss the opportunity to hold a press conference outside of First Street Courthouse on February 11, 2023 (before the Court's ruling on his motion), wherein his attorneys claimed that "the government is biased against Puig" and that there is a "systematic problem that unfairly sends more people of color to prison with stiffer penalties than White people."<sup>1</sup> Given the highly prejudicial nature of defendant's baseless

---

<sup>1</sup> The press conference was reported on KCAL News. See [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJr9P\\_WXB1I](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJr9P_WXB1I).

1 allegations related to the investigative team's racial bias --  
2 presented both to this Court and the public-at-large -- the  
3 government now seeks to exclude from trial all argument and testimony  
4 suggesting, in any way, that racial bias impacted the manner in which  
5 the government broadly investigated the illegal gambling operation  
6 led by Wayne Nix (the "Nix Gambling Business"), and the manner in  
7 which the government specifically investigated and/or charged  
8 defendant.<sup>2</sup> Such meritless arguments and/or lines of questioning  
9 would be lacking in foundation, irrelevant, and to the extent any  
10 probative value exists (it does not), such value would be  
11 substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Indeed,  
12 the only purpose of such argument and testimony would be to inflame  
13 the passions of the jury, and this Court should exercise its  
14 gatekeeping function to prevent any further attempts by defendant to  
15 taint the jury.

## 16 **II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY<sup>3</sup>**

17 On February 10, 2023, defendant filed a motion to compel  
18 discovery related to the government's alleged selective prosecution  
19 of him based on his race. (Dkt. 59.) Defendant specifically alleged  
20 that the government, throughout its investigation, "viewed Black men  
21 as untruthful and uncooperative," "berated and bullied" Black men  
22 (including defendant) in interviews, and refused to provide Black men  
23

---

24 <sup>2</sup> The government attempted to meet-and-confer with defense  
25 counsel to determine whether defendant intended to make arguments or  
26 elicit testimony related to the government investigative team's  
27 alleged racial bias on cross-examination or in its case-in-chief.  
28 Defense counsel responded that they have not yet decided whether they  
will seek to offer such evidence at trial.

<sup>3</sup> The government hereby incorporates the factual background  
detailed in its Motion in Limine No. 1 to Admit Evidence Inextricably  
Intertwined with the Charged Conduct, or in the Alternative, Admit  
Evidence Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), filed at Dkt. 205.

1 (including defendant) with sufficient time and information to refresh  
2 their recollections, as the government did with non-Black men. (Id.  
3 at 1, 7.) None of defendant's allegations, however, were supported  
4 by any evidence; to the contrary, evidence submitted by the  
5 government in support of its opposition to defendant's motion --  
6 declarations, interview reports, and audio recordings -- demonstrated  
7 that the investigative team conducted its investigation of the Nix  
8 Gambling Business in an ethical and race-neutral manner. (See Dkt.  
9 73-1 through 73-12).

10 Indeed, the evidence showed that the government conducted six  
11 target interviews and 27 non-target interviews in 2020 and 2021.  
12 (Dkt. 106 at 2-3.) The admonishments provided by the government to  
13 target and non-target individuals in these interviews did not evince  
14 racially disparate treatment of Black people. The six targets, none  
15 of whom are Black, have each entered guilty pleas to crimes other  
16 than making false statements or obstruction of justice. (Id. at 2.)  
17 According to former government counsel, AUSA Jeff Mitchell, most  
18 targets retained attorneys and were provided with proffer letters,  
19 which AUSA Mitchell reviewed with the targets. (Dkt. 73-1 at ¶¶ 4-  
20 5.) For each target proffer, AUSA Mitchell's standard practice was  
21 to discuss "the paragraph [] advis[ing] the target that [s/he could]  
22 be prosecuted for providing false statements." (Id. ¶ 5.)

23 The 27 non-target interviews proceeded in one of the following  
24 ways: (1) AUSA Mitchell advised the interviewee against making false  
25 statements and/or referenced or read the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1001;  
26 (2) a federal agent advised the interviewee in the same way; (3) the  
27 government provided the interviewee with Use Immunity, which contains  
28 a warning against giving false statements; or (4) no admonishment was

1 provided at all, because the interview was conducted by a field  
2 office. (Dkt. 106 at 2-3.) In defendant's interview, AUSA Mitchell  
3 advised the defendant against making false statements and read the  
4 text of § 1001 to defendant. (Dkt. 68 at 13; Dkt. 77 at 68.) In  
5 advising defendant this way, AUSA Mitchell advised defendant as just  
6 he advised non-Black interviewees, e.g., Individual 6. (Id.) As  
7 with many of the other interviews, AUSA Mitchell also provided  
8 defendant with numerous opportunities to confer with his counsel, and  
9 one specific opportunity, towards the end of the interview, to recant  
10 his false statements. (Dkt. 73-1 at ¶¶ 21-22.) Defendant, however,  
11 declined these opportunities and persisted in his lies. (Id. ¶ 22.)

12 This Court ultimately denied defendant's motion, finding that  
13 defendant failed to "come forward with some credible evidence of  
14 discriminatory intent and effect," and that there was simply "no  
15 evidence to suggest that the [18 U.S.C. § 1001] admonitions [provided  
16 to defendant and others involved in the Nix Gambling Business] were  
17 given in anything but a race-neutral manner." (Dkt. 106 at 6-7.)

### 18 **III. ARGUMENT**

19 Trial courts "have a duty to forestall or prevent" jury  
20 nullification, including by preventing "impermissible" defense  
21 questioning or argument. United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061,  
22 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Any arguments and  
23 questioning relating to defendant's race, defendant's co-  
24 conspirators' races, and the investigative team's alleged racial bias  
25 in prosecuting defendant and others involved in the Nix Gambling  
26 Business, or similar issues, are baseless, irrelevant, and unfairly  
27 prejudicial, and the Court should exclude them.

**A. Any Arguments or Testimony Related to the Investigative Team's Alleged Racial Bias Should Be Excluded as Baseless, Irrelevant and Unfairly Prejudicial**

At the outset, any suggestion by defendant -- through jury addresses, cross-examination questioning, or his affirmative case, if he presents one -- that the government investigated and charged him because he is Black should be excluded as a meritless attempt to inflame the sensitivities of the jury. The issue of whether the investigative team's prosecution of defendant was racially motivated was extensively briefed for defendant's motion to compel production of selective prosecution, and defendant could not articulate -- in either his motion, reply, or supplemental briefing (see Dkts. 59, 61, 80, 81, and 99) - any credible evidence to substantiate this theory. Again, AUSA Mitchell advised defendant against making false statements in his January 27, 2022 interview, and read him the text of § 1001. He further provided defendant with several opportunities to communicate privately with his attorneys and clarify his statements. As the government demonstrated through evidence submitted in support of its opposition to defendant's motion, AUSA Mitchell's admonitions and treatment of defendant in his interview were consistent with his treatment of non-Black individuals interviewed throughout the course of the government's Nix Gambling Business investigation. This Court should accordingly prevent defendant from making any suggestion at trial that the investigative team was impacted by implicit or explicit racial prejudice; this is simply not true, not anchored to any admissible evidence, lacking in foundation, and highly prejudicial.

Further, because "irrelevant evidence is not admissible," the only evidence admissible at trial is that which relates to elements

1 of the charged crimes. To prove defendant's guilt, the government  
2 must prove the elements of making false statements, in violation of  
3 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), and obstructing justice, in violation of  
4 1503(a). The only evidence admissible at trial is evidence that  
5 relates to those elements and has a "tendency to make a fact more or  
6 less probable." Fed. R. Evid. 401.

7 Arguments and questioning related to the agents' subjective  
8 motivations in investigating this case should be excluded as  
9 irrelevant and prejudicial. Indeed, agents' "subjective motivations  
10 are irrelevant" even when assessing whether evidence should be  
11 suppressed. United States v. Taylor, 60 F.4th 1233, 1240 (9th Cir.  
12 2023). That principle applies with equal, if not greater, force at  
13 trial. And whatever defendant's opinion on the propriety or fairness  
14 of the investigation leading to his charges, the Court has resolved  
15 that issue by denying defendant's motion to compel discovery of  
16 selective prosecution.

17 In addition, the Court may "exclude relevant evidence" if  
18 whatever probative value is outweighed by a "danger" of "unfair  
19 prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,"  
20 or "wasting time." Fed. R. Evid. 403. Courts have widely  
21 recognized that accusations of racism -- when not directly related  
22 to, for example, a defendant's motive or mental state -- are  
23 "potentially inflammatory." United States v. Tyrell, 840 F. App'x  
24 617, 623 (2d Cir. 2021). The Tyrell defendant sought to introduce  
25 "racist tweets" from a police officer who maintained a twitter account,  
26 "ObamaHater55." Even though "numerous tweets revealed explicit  
27 racial prejudice," the Second Circuit affirmed exclusion because the  
28



1 officer's prejudice was not relevant to his testimony, which related  
2 only to facts corroborated by other evidence. Id.

3 The same analysis favors excluding any arguments about the  
4 investigative team's alleged racial prejudice here. To be clear, the  
5 investigative team proceeded with the investigation of the Nix  
6 Gambling Business in a race-neutral manner. In his interview,  
7 defendant received a § 1001 admonition like many other non-Black  
8 interviewees. He was also provided with the opportunity to clarify  
9 his statements, like many other non-Black interviewees, but remained  
10 steadfast in his lies. Defendant's race was, and is, not at issue.  
11 The challenge to the propriety of the government's investigation with  
12 respect to the government's alleged racial prejudice was properly  
13 attempted through defendant's motion to compel production of  
14 selective prosecution -- which the Court has rejected. Any further  
15 argument directed toward the jury is not relevant to any of the  
16 elements of charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(2) or 1503(a).

17 That conclusion is consistent with decisions from courts across  
18 the country, which have excluded irrelevant racial arguments designed  
19 only to inflame the jury and stir emotions. See, e.g., Yowan Yang v.  
20 ActioNet, Inc., No. 14-cv-792-AB (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016) (excluded  
21 "race-based comments"); Clark v. Martinez, 295 F.3d 809, 814 (8th  
22 Cir. 2002) (rejecting evidence of racial motivation because "hostile  
23 motive is not an element" of the relevant charges). This Court  
24 should follow suit and exclude arguments and questioning related to  
25 the investigative team's alleged implicit and explicit racial biases  
26 under Rules 401 and 403.

**B. Arguments and Questioning Suggesting that the Investigative Team Prosecuted Defendant Because He Is Black Would Serve Only an Improper Purpose: Nullification**

The only purpose for arguments and questioning related to the investigative team's alleged racial prejudice then is to attempt to "back door" a jury nullification defense. See Powell, 955 F.2d at 1213 (holding that the defendant had no right to instruct the jury to nullify itself); see also United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1198 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that courts have "uniformly rejected" requests for jury nullification instructions) (citing cases). Because this is a jury trial on defendant's guilt, not a trial to relitigate defendant's motion to compel production of selective prosecution, this Court should preclude defendant from encouraging the jury to nullify through his baseless racial-prejudice theory. And defendant should not be permitted to argue a legal issue -- much less one where he could not even meet his burden to obtain discovery to support any motion to dismiss the indictment -- to the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Poschwatta, 829 F.2d 1477, 1483 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The court acts as the jury's sole source of the law."); United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 747 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[A]n indictment that results from selective prosecution will be dismissed" for violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). These jury nullification arguments must be excluded.

**C. Improper Argument Regarding the Government's Charging Decision and Defendant's Co-Conspirators**

The Supreme Court has recognized that "[i]n our criminal justice system, the [g]overnment retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). Indeed, charging decisions, which are "rarely simple," implicate

1 complex considerations including the strength and importance of a  
2 case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the government's  
3 enforcement priorities, and the allocation of resources. See Town of  
4 Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987). Given the broad  
5 discretion traditionally afforded to prosecutors, courts have  
6 consistently held that evidence or argument about charging decisions  
7 should not be admitted at trial. See United States v. Re, 401 F.3d  
8 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Boyle, No. S1 08 CR 523  
9 (CM), 2009 WL 5178525, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("While a defendant is  
10 entitled to cross-examine government witnesses as to inconsistent  
11 statements, the government's charging decisions are not proper  
12 subjects for cross-examination and argument.").

13       Inquiries into charging decisions generally do not tend to make  
14 facts of consequence more or less probable, and thus are irrelevant.  
15 See Fed. R. Evid. 401. Put another way, such inquiries lack any  
16 probative value as to defendant's guilt or innocence. Because  
17 inquiries into the government's charging decisions and enforcement  
18 practices are irrelevant to whether the government has proven that  
19 defendant committed the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt,  
20 they should be excluded on that basis alone.

21       For the same reasons, defendant should not be permitted to refer  
22 to the absence of "more culpable" co-conspirators from either the  
23 government's case at large or defendant's trial in particular. See  
24 United States v. Hearns, CR 15-474-PSG, Dkt. 812 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20,  
25 2021) (granting government's request to exclude evidence and  
26 arguments related to profits earned in the scheme by absent co-  
27 defendants because such evidence would mislead the jury into  
28 "sympathizing with one or more [d]efendants based on their relative

financial gain from the scheme"). Although defendant was not charged with conspiring to operate an illegal gambling business, his charges -- false statements and obstruction of justice -- are rooted in his lies to disguise his involvement in that conspiracy, and evidence presented at trial will demonstrate as much. Thus, any arguments related to "more culpable" co-conspirators of the Nix Gambling Business absent from trial would be misleading, especially given defendant's counsel's statements, in defendant's First Street Courthouse press conference, that "Yasiel has gotten more of a press statement and release from this Office than the people who were committing the heinous crimes[.]" And to the degree defendant attempts to allege that other co-conspirators that were not charged federally are more culpable, that, too, is improper.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully requests that this Court grant its motion in limine to exclude improper evidence related to the government's investigation and charging decision in this case.

Dated: September 29, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

BILAL A. ESSAYLI  
Acting United States Attorney

JOSEPH T. MCNALLY  
Assistant United States Attorney  
Acting Chief, Criminal Division

/s/ Laura A. Alexander

JUAN M. RODRIGUEZ  
MICHAEL J. MORSE  
LAURA A. ALEXANDER  
Assistant United States Attorneys

Attorneys for Plaintiff  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA